«Paul Bloom: "It's not things like eating meat that bother me the most. It's cases where I've disappointed people, where I've treated people badly.»
I just discovered this substack and its authors or guests.
Having read this strange and terrible sentence, I wish to leave a comment. By eating meat you participate in the cessation of a life, I do not know if you were fully aware of it, a little, I suppose, because otherwise you would not have talked about it. It does not matter to you, or much less, than the fact of having wronged people, having them more or less treated, etc.
Which is certainly not approvable, but put it on top of a life!
Rationality (the principle of sense, the fundamental laws of meaning) also demand(s) that we have consistent and sound reasons in favour of what is the moral/right thing to do. The argument from (biological) evolution is still begging the question about the rightness of things, the rightness of our sentiments: what we have evolved to feel as the right thing to do is not necessarily aligned with the rational, objectively right thing to do. At the same time, the morally right thing to do cannot be irrational or else morality itself would be irrational. In short, moral realism/objectivism (or what we take for universal morality) demands a priori proofs of our moral claims.
«Paul Bloom: "It's not things like eating meat that bother me the most. It's cases where I've disappointed people, where I've treated people badly.»
I just discovered this substack and its authors or guests.
Having read this strange and terrible sentence, I wish to leave a comment. By eating meat you participate in the cessation of a life, I do not know if you were fully aware of it, a little, I suppose, because otherwise you would not have talked about it. It does not matter to you, or much less, than the fact of having wronged people, having them more or less treated, etc.
Which is certainly not approvable, but put it on top of a life!
Rationality (the principle of sense, the fundamental laws of meaning) also demand(s) that we have consistent and sound reasons in favour of what is the moral/right thing to do. The argument from (biological) evolution is still begging the question about the rightness of things, the rightness of our sentiments: what we have evolved to feel as the right thing to do is not necessarily aligned with the rational, objectively right thing to do. At the same time, the morally right thing to do cannot be irrational or else morality itself would be irrational. In short, moral realism/objectivism (or what we take for universal morality) demands a priori proofs of our moral claims.